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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JACK A. :MILLIGAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
MELVIN COY HARWARD, 
KENNETH B. McDUFFY, 
and C. E. LINDSEY, 
DefcllclaJlts and Respondents. 
Case No. 9121 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PHELI.JUXARY STATE~IE~T 
Throughout this brief, plaintiff and appellant will be 
referred to as plaintiff, and defendant and respondent" 
will be referred to by their surnames or as defendants. 
All italics are ours. 
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STATEMJ£N'r OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was a guest passenger in an automobile 
driven by defendant, :Melvin Coy Harward, on the 15th 
of August, 1958, which collided with the truck of defend-
ant, Lindsey, at approximately 1:30 A.M. 
Prior to the collision, plaintiff, James Finnegan, and 
Harward had been playing pool in the Lackawanna Club 
at 3110 South State Street. 
As plaintiff, Harward and Finnegan, played pool 
they drank beer purchased from the Club. Plaintiff and 
Finnegan had had one glass of beer to drink during the 
evening of August 14th, prior to the time that they arrived 
at the Lackawanna Club and before they ate their supper. 
Both Finnegan and plaintiff testified that they no-
ticed nothing wrong with the way that the defendant, 
Harward, played pool; that as far as they could observe 
his behavior was entirely normal and regular. Plaintiff 
and Finnegan n1et Harward at the Lackawanna Club. 
Harward had had no supper before con1ing to the Club. 
(R.160). After the plaintiff, Finnegan, and Hanvard had 
completed their pool games they went out of the Lacka-
wanna Club to the defendant Harward's car and started 
north along State Street toward the New China Cafe lo-
cated at about 2150 South State Street. 
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Defendant, Kenneth B. :McDuffy, was the driver of 
a K.enilworth truck and trailer and had parked the ve-
hicles at 2195 South State Street. Harward's automobile 
came into collision with the left rear of the truck. The 
·weather was rainy. Plaintiff was seated in the car with 
back against the door on the righthand side relaxed and 
discussing with the driver Harward their social affairs 
and did not observe anything ahead of the car in which 
he was riding prior to its impact. 
Plaintiff was seriously injured as result of the colli-
sion and at the time of the trial had not recovered fully 
from the effects of the accident. 
Plaintiff claimed that the defendant Harward was 
guilty of wilful rnisconduct, or was intoxicated, at the 
time of the irnpact in which he received his injuries 
and that said conduct was the proxirnate cause of the in-
jury and collision. 
Plaintiff claimed that the defendants, McDuffy and 
Lindsey, were negligent in that the truck which was park-
ed on the east side of State Street was unlighted and 
protruded out into the lane of traffic norrnally reserved 
for travelers proceeding in a northerly direction. 
The evidence revealed that neither plaintiff nor Fin-
negan, the guests in the autornobile of Harward, had 
noticed anything peculiar or unusual about Harward's 
conduct and did not believe, at the tirne they entered his 
autonwbile, that he "·as under the influence of intoxicat-
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ing liquor, although both had played several hours of pool 
with him and observed hin1 drinking beer as the game 
of pool proceeded. Officer Iba, after the accident, ob-
served Harward for a while and formed the opinion that 
he was intoxicated. (R. 61). 
Neither plaintiff nor Finnegan noticed anything un-
usual about the way that Harward operated his car as he 
drove it the few blocks north along State Street immedi-
ately prior to the collision. 
Harward stated that i1nmediately prior to the impact 
he turned his head away fron1 the front to the right facing 
to the back seat to take a cigarette from Finnegan who 
was seated in the back seat. That as he came back the 
impact occurred. (R. 162). 
After the presentation of plaintiff's evidence the trial 
court granted the motions of all defendants for dismissal 
of plaintiff's case on the ground and for the reason that 
the evidence would not justify a verdict in plaintiff's 
favor. From this Order of the Trial Court, plaintiff has 
prosecuted his appeal to this Court. 
SUl\IMARY OF ARGUlfENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED THAT HARWARD 
WAS GUILTY OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT OR INTOXICA-
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TION PROXIMATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
(a) HARWARD WAS GUILTY OF WILFUL MISCON-
DUCT IN TURNING AROUND AND LOOKING 'TO THE 
BACK SEAT AS HE DROVE NORTH ON STATE STREET. 
POINT .II 
THE EVIDENCE CREATED A QUES'TION OF FACT 
AS TO THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAIN-
TIFF. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE DE-
FENDANTS McDUFFY AND LINDSEY WERE GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTING TO ·CAUS-
ING PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES . 
.ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRA'TED THAT HARWARD 
WAS GUILTY OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT OR INTOXICA-
TION PROXIMATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
The Jury was furnished with sufficient factual basis 
for a finding that the defendant, Harward, was intoxi-
cated at the tune of the collision and injury of plaintiff. 
The evidence and testi1nony of the witnesses is relatively 
free from conflict. Harward adn1itted that he had con-
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sun1ed at least five cans of beer while playing pool with 
plaintiff and Finnegan. Officer Iba, after observing Har-
ward for a considerable ti1ne caine to the conclusion that 
he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The 
evidence showed that Har\vard had not eaten anything 
since approximately 2 :00 or 3 :00 o'clock in the afternoon. 
Under such circu1nstances the effect of the beer would be 
greater than the smne amount of beverage on plaintiff 
and Finnegan, who had eaten a substantial supper prior 
to coming to the Club. The Jury might logically find 
that Harward was nwre affected by the beer which he 
drank because of the lack of food in his stomach than 
would have normally have been the case. Five cans of 
beer or five glasses of beer could be sufficient to affect 
his ability to drive and to make him unable to carefully 
and safely operate his vehicle. Iba's testimony from ob-
servation over a considerable period of tune would be 
sufficient basis for the finding that Harward was in-
toxicated. 
Each case must stand on its own peculiar factual 
basis, but perhaps a consideration of a few of the cases 
from this and other jurisdictions would be of assistance. 
The closest case on the facts and law is Johnson v. 
lllarqui·s, 93 Cal. App. 2nd 3-U, 209 P.:2d 63. The Cali-
fornia Guest Statute is si1nilar in wording to our Utah 
Guest Rtatute. The basir legal principles were the 
t:laine as will be applied in this Court. In the Johnson 
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case, the owner and driver of the automobile had not 
eaten anything during the afternoon and had only a cup 
of coffee and a sandwich for her lunch. She, and the two 
passengers, stopped at a cafe and there the driver had 
one Seven-up highball. She took over the driving of the 
autornobile and drove from that tirne until she struck the 
back of a parked truck which had a red light burning at 
its rear. The road over which she drove was a two-lane 
highway and the night was stormy. The evidence shows 
that she drove at 80 to 90 miles per hour even though 
there were rnany turns in the highway. 
The California Appellate Court emphasized the fact 
that the driver had not eaten for a considerable period 
prior to the tirne that she had the one Seven-up highball 
and pointed out that the exact effect of intoxicants on any 
one person is dependent on a number of factors and may 
be different in one state of bodily chemistry from what 
it is in another state of bodily chemistry. The Court 
upheld the Jury verdict and found that the driver was 
guilty of wilful rnisconduct or intoxication in causing the 
collision with the rear end of the truck and the injuries 
to the passengers. 
In Cox c. Johnson, ______ Colo. ______ , 339 P. 2d 989, the 
driver was drinking beer but appeared before the acci-
dent to have been sober. The evidence revealed that prior 
to the accident the driver had drunk front three to nine 
beers. Two witnesses testified that he did not appear 
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to be drunk. The plaintiff himself observed defendant 
drinking three or four beers. 
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the questions 
of intoxication, assumption of risk, and wilful miscon-
duct, were all questions of fact for the Jury. Plaintiff 
subrnits that the Cox v. Johnson case is in point on all of 
the questions before this Court. 
Perry v. Schm~tt, 184 Kan. 758, 339 P. 2d 36, is a 
case where the guest observed the driver drinking and 
the Court ruled that the question of intoxication was a 
question of fact for the Jury. 
It is respectfully submitted that under the principles 
of law applicable and the evidence the Jury could have 
found, considering the evidence most favorably to the 
plaintiff, that Harward was intoxicated at the time of the 
collision. 
SUB POINT "A" 
(a) HARWARD WAS GUILTY OF WILFUL MISCON-
DUCT IN TURNING AROUND AND LOOKING 'TO THE 
BACK SEAT AS HE DROVE NORTH ON STATE STREET. 
The conduct of the defendant, Harward, in turning 
around to take a cigarette from passenger, Finnegan, 
riding in the back seat is wilful misconduct. It was a 
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proxi1nate cause of the collision between his car and the 
truck. 
This Court has had a cigarette case before it on one 
prior occasion. In Ricciuti v. Roberts, 2 Utah 2d 45, 269 
P.2d 282, the driver of the automobile dropped a cigar-
ette in his clothing and while hunting the cigarette went 
over the curb and caused the injury to his passenger. The 
decision, reversing the Jury Verdict, was that the conduct 
of the driver was not the intentionally doing or omitting 
to do a negligent act, but that his hunting for the cigar-
ette was an involuntary act and could not be the basis of a 
verdict which must be based on wilful misconduct. The 
Court pointed out that the cigarette was not intentionally 
dropped, and as a consequence it could not be held to be 
wilful. 
In the present case, the distinction is clear. Har-
ward, in turning around to the right to take a cigarette 
from a person riding in the back seat was not acting in-
voluntarily but was voluntarily and intentionally acting. 
It seems obvious his act was very dangerous. This is 
especially true since he had begun to pull over toward 
the right-hand side of the highway preparatory to stop-
ping at the New China Cafe. 
There are a number of cases that have held that 
voluntarily and intentionally taking your eyes off the 
road is gross negligence or wilful misconduct. 
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Gttstaveson v. J' ernon, 165 Kebr. 745, 87 NW 2d. 
395, was a case in which the driver took her eyes off the 
road for approximately four second:-:;, and during that 
time the car whi~h she was driving veered across the 
road into a parked automobile on the side of the road and 
caused the injuries to her guest resulting in a jury verdict 
in her .favor. The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the 
verdict and considered the conduct on the part of the 
driver to be sufficient to justify a finding of the jury 
that she was guilty of gross negligence. 
In Dirks v. Gates, 182 Kan. 581, 322 P.2d 750, the 
driver turned his head from the road to look back and ob-
serve traffic on the road behind him. As a result, the 
automobile went out of control and the injuries to hi8 
guest occurred. The Court held that such conduct on 
the part of the driver \vas wanton negligence and upheld 
the verdict in favor of the guest. 
Topel v. Correz, 273 \Vis. 611, 79 N\V 2d 253, is a 
case of the driver being somewhat intoxicated, driving 
along the highway and watching the speedometer rather 
than keeping his eyes on the road and as a consequence 
the automobile ran off the road· and into a tree injuring 
the owner of the autmnobile who was riding in it as a 
passenger. The Court held that this conduct on the part 
of the ·driver was sufficient to justify a verdict in favor 
of the owner guest riding in the automobile. 
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SimJJson v. lJfarks, 349 Ill. App. 527, 111 NE 2d. 
310, is a case of a driver who, the passenger claimed, 
took his hands off the wheel and attempted to make love 
to her while driving the automobile. The driver claimed, 
however, that he turned his head from the road to watch 
an accident scene that had occurred in the opposite lane 
of traffic and as a result the collision occurred. The 
Court considered both plaintiff's claim that the driver 
attempted to make love to her and took his hands off the 
wheel, and the driver's claim that what occurred was that 
he was looking back watching an automobile accident in 
the opposite lane of traffic. Defendant claimed that the 
plaintiff's story that he took his hands off the wheel to 
make love to her was so improbable and unreasonable as 
not to be worthy of belief. The Court ruled that even 
defendant's own story that he turned around to watch an 
automobile accident in the opposite lane of traffic would 
justify the Jury's verdict. The driver would be still guilty 
of wilful and wanton misconduct. 
Perhaps the case closest to the facts of the case 
presently before the Court is McGowan v. Camp, 87 Ga. 
App. 671, 75 S.E. 2d 350. In this case, the driver of the 
auton1obile took her right hand off the wheel and her 
eyes off the road in order to reprimand her small son who 
was riding in the front seat with her. The Court held 
this conduct sufficient to constitute gross negligence and 
justify a verdict in favor of the guest of the driver. 
The Court pointed out that this kind of action was an 
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intentional and deliberate act on the part of the driver 
as distinguished from an involuntary act. This distinc-
tion exists between the vresent case and Rvcciuti v. Rob-
inson, 2 Utah 2d 45, 269 P .2d 282. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the conduct of 
the defendant, Harward, was deliberate and wilful. It 
was the kind of action which was known and realizable as 
would greatly endanger persons riding in the automobile 
with the driver. 
Such act, it is respectfully submitted, would justify 
a jury verdict on behalf of the plaintiff, if no intoxication 
was even considered. When considered with the fact of 
intoxication it would, of course, be n1uch more forceful as 
far as justifying a Jury verdict in favor of plaintiff. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE CREATED A QUES'TION OF FACT 
AS TO THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAIN-
TIFF. 
The Court's granting of defendant's :Jiotion to dis-
miss plaintiff's case might be justified upon a mistaken 
belief that under the evidence the plaintiff was contri-
butorily negligent as matter of law. 
There has been a great deal of appellate consideration 
of the question of whether or not a guest's knowledge 
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that the driver of the autmnobile in which he was riding 
had been drinking is sufficient to preclude recovery of 
the guest. 
Smne Courts have based the denial of a guest's 
right of recovery on the idea that the guest assumed the 
risk of injury in entering the automobile knowing that the 
driver had been drinking. Other ·Courts have considered 
it a siinple question of contributory negligence on the 
part of the guest. The soundest rule seems to be the one 
which was adopted by this Court and set up in the case 
of Shoemaker v. Floor, 117 Utah 434, 217 P. 2d 382. The 
guest in the Schoemaker case observed the defendant take 
three drinks prior to the time that she got in the car 
and com1nenced her ride back to Salt Lake City. She 
testified, however, that even though she observed him take 
three drinks, the driver did not appear in any way to be 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. This Court 
held that under such circu1nstances the guest did not as-
sume the risk as Inatter of law, and was not guilty of 
contributory negligence. 
Applying the principle set down in the Shoemaker 
v. Floor supra case, it would appear that even though 
plaintiff here knew that defendant Harward had been 
drinking beer, unless he knew it had so affected Harward 
as to incapacitate hin1 from driving safely and prudent-
ly, he would not be guilty of contributory negligence nor 
would he haYe been held to asstnne risk as matter of law. 
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The principle applied by this Court in the Schoe-
maker case is similar to the principles applied by the Cali-
fornia Court under sirnilar Statute in the case of Johnson 
v. Marquis) 93 Cal. App. 2d 341, 209 P.2d 63. There, 
the guests were present with the driver when she drank 
one Seven-up highball, and thereafter drove the auto-
rnobile into the back of a parked truck. The Court held 
that the guests did not assume the risk, or were not guilty 
of contributory negligence as matter of law. Each case 
must depend on the particular facts involved, and such 
facts are properly submitted to the Jury for determina-
tion. 
Cox v. J ohnsonJ ______ Colo. ______ , 239 P. 2d 989, holds 
that the fact that the guest observed the driver drinking 
three or four beers did not, as n1atter of law, make him 
guilty of assumption of risk or contributory negligence. 
In Topel v. CorrezJ 273 \Vis. 611, 79 NW 2d 253, the 
owner of the auton1obile, because he, himself, was intoxi-
cated and did not feel cmnpetent to drive his own car, 
requested another person to drive for hin1. The other 
driver wa~ intoxicated and ·while watching the speedo-
rneter on the autonwbile ran off the road into a tree and 
injured the owner of the car who ·was his guest. The 
Court held that under the facts the owner guest was not 
guilty of contributory negligence or asstunption of ri~k 
so that his recovery could be barred as n1atter of law. 
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Davis v. Hollowell, 326 _l\lich. 673, 40 NW 2d 641, 
15 ALR 2d 1160, holds that knowledge on the part of a 
guest that driver had been drinking is not sufficient with-
out more to bar the guest's recovery. 
The annotation of the Davis v. Hollowell case, 15 
ALR 2d 1165, is a very complete enumeration and analy-
sis of the various holdings concerning the question of 
knowledge and contributory negligence, or assumption of 
risk. The annotators state their conclusion as follows: 
"It has been held in a number of cases that 
mere knowledge that the driver has been drinking 
is not sufficient to preclude recovery under Guest 
Statutes." 
In support of this conclusion the Annotation cites 
cases from California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, :Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Y ermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, and cites the Utah case of Shoemaker v. Floor. 
The annotation recites the principle that for a passenger 
to be barred from recovery he must know, or in the exer-
cise of ordinary care, should know that the driver is so 
intoxicated as to be incapacitated frmn driving safely and 
prudently before recovery could be barred as 1natter of 
law. 
Plaintiff respectfully sub1nits that there is no show-
ing frmn the evidence presented that he knew, or in the 
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exercise of ordinary care should have known that Har-
ward was intoxicated so as to be incapacitated from driv-
ing safely and prudently. rrhe action of the Trial Court 
cannot be justified on any theory that plaintiff assumed 
the risk, or was guilty of contributory negligence as mat-
ter of law. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED 'THAT THE DE-
FENDANTS McDUFFY AND LINDSEY WERE GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTING TO ·CAUS-
ING PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
One of the most hotly contested questions of fact in 
the presentation of plaintiff's evidence was where exactly 
the truck was parked on the highway and whether or not 
there were parking lights burning on it. Appendix "A" 
is a photograph of the drawing made by Officer Iba to 
illustrate his testimony and to show the various measure-
ments which were made at the scene of the accident. 
The Statutes of the State of Utah require that a 
vehicle be parked not more than eighteen (18) inches 
from the curb, U.C.A. 1953, Section 41-6-104. No truck 
operating on the highway 1nay legally exceed eight feet 
in width, U.C.A. 1953, Section :27-1-:27. Officer Iba and 
the Appendix .. A" indicates that to the center of the rear 
wheel on the truck of Lindsey was 11 feet 5% ths inches 
frorn the curb line of State Street. This measuren1ent 
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shows that the truck of the defendant Lindsey was not 
properly parked assuming that its width conformed and 
was the lawful width for such vehicles under the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
Defendant Harward testified that there were no 
lights on the rear of the parked truck innnediately prior 
to the collision. (R. 163). L'.C.A. 1953, Sectvon 41-6-129 
requires a vehicle to have such a light where it cannot 
be seen within a distance of 500 feet upon such highway. 
Harward also testified that the right front of his 
automobile struck the left rear of the truck, and that 
the point of i1npact was barely a fraction of inches and 
had he been a few inches further out in the street he 
would have missed the truck, or had the truck been parked 
a few inches closer to the curb he would have cleared it. 
(R.168) 
There can be no doubt that where there is more than 
one cause of a collision all parties Inay be held responsible 
where negligence is found to exist. 
In Berry i'. Visser, 35-1 :\lieh. 38, 92 NW 2d 1, the 
Supreme Court of the State of :Michigan held that even 
though a driver is negligent the negligence of the owner 
and driver of a parked vehicle may likewise be a proxi-
mate cause of the accident and both parties can be held 
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responsible for the ultimate damage to a party injured 
as a result of the collision. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the evidence of 
Iba and the drawing, Appendix "A", together with the 
laws of the State of Utah, would justify submission to 
the Jury of the question of whether or not the defendants, 
McDuffy and Lindsey, were negligent, and whether or 
not their negligence was a proximate cause of the colli-
sion between the automobile in which plaintiff was a 
passenger and the truck parked at the side of the road 
into which the automobile collided. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the facts of the 
case and the law of the State of Utah demonstrate that 
the Trial Court was in error in granting the motions of 
the defendant for dismissal of plaintiff's case at the 
close of plaintiff's evidence. The Judgment should be 
reversed. Plaintiff should be granted a new trial and 
an opportunity to have his cause of action submitted to a 
Jury for their consideration and determination. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
KING AND HUGHES 
Counsel for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
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